You and me versus the rest of the world: the effects of affiliative motivation and ingroup partner status on social tuning.

Bandura argues that individuals are more likely to engage in social learning when they identify with a social model and when they are motivated or rewarded. Therefore, in the present work, we investigate how these two key factors, perceived similarity and affiliative motivation, influence the extent to which individuals engage in social tuning or align their views with an interaction partner-especially if their partner's attitudes differ from the larger social group. Experiment 1 (170 participants) explored the role of perceived similarity through group membership when needing to work collaboratively with a collaboration partner whose climate change beliefs differed from a larger social group. Experiment 2 (115 participants) directly manipulated affiliative motivation (i.e., length of interaction time) along with perceived similarity (i.e., Greek Life membership) to explore if these factors influenced social tuning of drinking attitudes and behaviors. Experiments 3 (69 participants) and 4 (93 participants) replicated Experiment 2 and examined whether tuning occurred for explicit and implicit attitudes towards weight (negative views Experiment 3 and positive views Experiment 4). Results indicate that when individuals experience high affiliative motivation, they are more likely to engage in social tuning of explicit and implicit attitudes when their interaction partner belongs to their ingroup rather than their outgroup. These findings are consistent with the tenets of Social Learning Theory, Shared Reality Theory, and the affiliative social tuning hypothesis.

The effects of perspective taking primes on the social tuning of explicit and implicit views toward gender and race.

The current research aims to investigate whether perspective taking influences social tuning, or the alignment of one's self-views, explicit attitudes, and/or implicit attitudes with those of an interaction partner. In six different experiments, participants believed they would interact with a partner to complete a task. Prior to this ostensible interaction, participants were given a perspective taking mindset prime, or not, and information about their ostensible interaction partners views. Participants then completed attitude measures related to the partner's perceived views. Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2 examined whether perspective taking with an ostensible interaction partner who endorses gender traditional (or non-traditional) views align their self-views with this partner, including implicit self-views (Experiment 2). Experiments 3-5 investigated whether perspective taking leads to social tuning for egalitarian racial attitudes, including when the partner's expectations of how others will be and when the participant learns their ostensible IAT score at the beginning of the session. We predicted perspective takers would be more likely to social tune their explicit and implicit attitudes to the attitudes of their interaction partner than non-perspective takers. Across all experiments, perspective takers were more likely to social tune their self-views and explicit attitudes than non-perspective takers. However, social tuning never occurred for implicit attitudes. Thus, future research is needed to understand why perspective taking does not influence the tuning of implicit attitudes, but other motivations, like affiliative and epistemic, do.

Understanding Side-Effect Intentionality Asymmetries: Meaning, Morality, or Attitudes and Defaults?

People frequently label harmful (but not helpful) side effects as intentional. One proposed explanation for this asymmetry is that moral considerations fundamentally affect how people think about and apply the concept of intentional action. We propose something else: People interpret the meaning of questions about intentionally harming versus helping in fundamentally different ways. Four experiments substantially support this hypothesis. When presented with helpful (but not harmful) side effects, people interpret questions concerning intentional helping as literally asking whether helping is the agents' intentional action or believe questions are asking about why agents acted. Presented with harmful (but not helpful) side effects, people interpret the question as asking whether agents intentionally acted, knowing this would lead to harm. Differences in participants' definitions consistently helped to explain intentionality responses. These findings cast doubt on whether side-effect intentionality asymmetries are informative regarding people's core understanding and application of the concept of intentional action.

Reconstructing the side-effect effect: A new way of understanding how moral considerations drive intentionality asymmetries.

People typically apply the concept of intentionality to actions directed at achieving desired outcomes. For example, a businessperson might intentionally start a program aimed at increasing company profits. However, if starting the program leads to a foreknown and harmful side effect (e.g., to the environment), the side effect is frequently labeled as intentional even though it was not specifically intended or desired. In contrast, positive side effects (e.g., helping the environment) are rarely labeled as intentional. One explanation of this side-effect effect-that harmful (but not helpful) side effects are labeled as intentional-is that moral considerations influence whether people view actions as intentional or not, implying that bad outcomes are perceived as more intentional than good outcomes. The present research, however, shows that people redefine questions about intentionality to focus on agents' foreknowledge in harming cases and on their lack of desire or intention in helpful cases, suggesting that the same intentionality question is being interpreted differently as a function of side effect valence. Consistent with this, removing foreknowledge lowers the frequency of labeling harming as intentional without affecting whether people label helping as intentional. Likewise, increasing agents' desire to help or avoid harming increases rates of labeling helping as intentional without affecting rates of labeling harming as intentional. In summary, divergent decisions to label side effects as intentional or not appear to reflect differences in the criteria people use to evaluate each case, resulting in different interpretations of what questions about intentionality are asking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Implicit Bias Predicts Liking of Ingroup Members Who Are Comfortable With Intergroup Interaction.

We test a novel framework for how ingroup members are perceived during intergroup interaction. Across three experiments, we found that, above and beyond egalitarian attitudes and motivations, White observers' automatic responses to Blacks (i.e., their implicit anti-Black bias) shaped their affiliation toward ingroup targets who appeared comfortable engaging in interracial versus same-race interaction. White observers' implicit anti-Black bias negatively correlated with liking of White targets who were comfortable with Blacks (Experiments 1-3). The relationship between implicit bias and liking varied as a function of targets' nonverbal comfort in interracial interactions (Experiment 1). Specifically, implicit bias negatively correlated with liking of targets when targets' nonverbal behaviors revealed observers felt comfortable with interracial contact, irrespective of the nature of those behaviors (Experiment 2). Finally, the relationship between implicit bias and target liking was mediated by perceived similarity (Experiment 3). Theoretical implications for stigma-by-association, social network homogeneity, and extended contact are discussed.

Shared reality through social tuning of implicit prejudice.

Sharing reality with an interaction partner is a key element of social connections. One way in which shared reality can be formed in an interpersonal situation is through affiliative social tuning. Affliative social tuning occurs when individuals experience a desire to get along with their interaction partner and this affiliative motivation encourages the individual to spontaneously and genuinely align their attitudes and/or behaviors with their interaction partner to achieve a sense of shared reality. In this review, we examine when and how affiliative social tuning of implicit prejudice occurs. We also explore whether individuals garner shared reality by affiliating with ingroup members who seem to hold similar implicit beliefs.

User-centric design of a personal assistance robot (FRASIER) for active aging.

We present our preliminary results from the design process for developing the Worcester Polytechnic Institute's personal assistance robot, FRASIER, as an intelligent service robot for enabling active aging. The robot capabilities include vision-based object detection, tracking the user and help with carrying heavy items such as grocery bags or cafeteria trays. This work-in-progress report outlines our motivation and approach to developing the next generation of service robots for the elderly. Our main contribution in this paper is the development of a set of specifications based on the adopted user-centered design process, and realization of the prototype system designed to meet these specifications.

Human-centered design of a cyber-physical system for advanced response to Ebola (CARE).

We describe the process towards the design of a safe, reliable, and intuitive emergency treatment unit to facilitate a higher degree of safety and situational awareness for medical staff, leading to an increased level of patient care during an epidemic outbreak in an unprepared, underdeveloped, or disaster stricken area. We start with a human-centered design process to understand the design challenge of working with Ebola treatment units in Western Africa in the latest Ebola outbreak, and show preliminary work towards cyber-physical technologies applicable to potentially helping during the next outbreak.

Moral credentialing by association: the importance of choice and relationship closeness.

People express more prejudice if they have established their "moral credentials." Five studies explored the acquisition of moral credentials through associations with racial minorities, particularly close relationships that are personally chosen. Participants choosing to write about a positive experience with a Black person (Study 1) or Hispanic person (Study 2) subsequently expressed more preference for Whites and tolerance of prejudice than did other participants. In Study 3, the credentialing effect of choice was diminished when participants were given an incentive for that choice. Participants in Study 4 who wrote about a Black friend were more credentialed than those who wrote about a Black acquaintance, regardless of whether the experience was positive or negative. Study 5 suggested that participants strategically referred to close associations with minorities when warned of a future situation in which they might appear prejudiced.

Self-Esteem Depends on the Beholder: Effects of a Subtle Social Value Cue.

The idea that self-esteem functions as a gauge or "sociometer" of social value (Leary & Baumeister, 2000) is supported by research on direct social feedback. To examine if the sociometer model is relevant to more subtle social value cues, the implicit self-esteem of women was assessed a week after an interaction with an experimenter. Consistent with the sociometer model, Week 2 self-esteem depended on a subtle social value cue encountered during Week 1. When the Week 1 experimenter wore a t-shirt celebrating larger bodies (i.e., "everyBODY is beautiful"), heavier women had higher self-esteem than lighter women in Week 2. As hypothesized, this effect was relationship-specific, occurring only when the same experimenter administered Week 1 and 2 sessions.

Social tuning of the self: consequences for the self-evaluations of stereotype targets.

These experiments examined how social interactions with individuals who ostensibly have stereotype-relevant views affect the self-evaluations of stereotype targets. Participants believed they were going to interact, or actually interacted, with a person who ostensibly had stereotype-consistent or stereotype-inconsistent views about their social group. Consistent with shared reality theory, participants' self-evaluations (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and behavior (Experiment 2) corresponded with the ostensible views of the other person when affiliative motivation was high. This occurred even when it was likely to be detrimental to participants' nonaffiliative outcomes (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that self-evaluative shift away from the ostensible views of another person was a function of social distance motives, also consistent with shared reality theory.